We analyze political representation of preferences of different income groups by matching referendum outcomes for low, middle, and high-income voters with individual legislators' decisions on identical policy proposals. Results indicate that legislators more closely represent preferences of rich voters than preferences of middle-income and poor voters, and legislators are more responsive towards the rich. Preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are, however, correlated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Does income matter for political representation? In principle, democracy rests on the notion that citizen's preferences should count equally. But a popular belief is that preferences of the rich count more. The literature on income and representation by individual legislators offers inconclusive evidence on this issue (see Bartels 2008, Bhatti and Erikson 2011) . A major challenge is to elicit preferences of voters with different incomes concerning policy proposals and confront them with actual political decisions by individual legislators.
We overcome this challenge by matching revealed preferences of voters with different incomes with decisions by individual legislators. In Switzerland, voters regularly reveal their policy preferences in referenda. Representative post referendum surveys allow identifying referendum decisions of low, middle, and high-income voters. Legislators decide in parliament on the identical issues as voters in referenda. Thus, we directly observe the extent of congruence between individual legislators' decisions and preferences of voter income terciles on identical policy proposals.
Empirical results indicate that revealed preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are correlated. Individual legislators represent the preferences of rich voters on average with a 1.7%-points and a 4.0%-points higher probability than the preferences of middle-income and poor voters, respectively. Representation varies with party affiliation: Legislators from left parties have higher congruence levels with the poor than with the rich, while the opposite holds for legislators from center and right parties. Legislators from center parties have the highest congruence levels with all income groups. Analyzing political responsiveness suggests that legislators are more responsive to the preferences of the rich.
We present the institutional setting and our data in Section 2, assess representation of income groups by individual legislators in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4.
II. POLICY PREFERENCES OF INCOME GROUPS AND POLITICAL DECISIONS
To analyze whether political representation depends on income, we must know how individual legislators decided on a large number of policy proposals and map their decisions to preferences of voters of different income groups. In Switzerland, as in other democratic countries, legislators decide on policy proposals. However, Swiss voters can demand a referendum on any parliamentary law decision and they can advance proposals for constitutional amendments ("initiatives"). Signature requirements are low and referenda are mandatory for all constitutional changes (see Portmann et al. 2012 for details). Thus, both, voters in referenda and legislators in parliament decide on identically worded proposals such that their choices can be directly compared. Referendum decisions are binding. Voters reveal preferences in referenda which represent a dichotomous choice between the legislative proposal at stake and the status quo (see Schneider et al. 1981 , Frey 1994 , Carey and Hix 2013 
III. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF INCOME GROUPS
Congruence levels Table 1 evaluates Robustness tests yield qualitatively similar interpretations. The congruence level between legislators and the majority of all voters evaluated with VOX-surveys (65.4%) is fully in line with the actual overall congruence using the official national result (64.5%) which points to the representativeness and correctness of the survey responses. 5 For robustness, we restrict the sample of legislative decisions and accompanying referenda (1) to constitutional proposals only, (2) to clear cut referendum results (absolute support higher than 52.5%), and (3) form two income groups (below and above the median income). 
Unequal responsiveness
To evaluate legislators' responsiveness to the preferences of low, middle, and highincome voters, we estimate the change in the likelihood that a legislator accepts a proposal as a function of an income tercile's revealed preferences by means of a logistic model. The binary dependent variable indicates whether a legislator votes "yes". This type of analysis is credited to allow a flexible account of political responsiveness (see Bartels 2008) . We always control for party fixed effects, include an intercept, and report robust clustered standard errors for individual legislators. Table 2 reports the results. Notes: Dependent variable is "Legislator Votes YES" in parliament. The column "%-point-change" gives average effect in percentage points on the probability to observe the dependent variable for a 1-%-point change of the independent variable. *** <1%, ** 1-5%, * 5-10% significance level.
Preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are highly correlated ( Responsiveness is highest for the rich and negative for poor voters. 6 Ceteris paribus, an increase in the preferences of the rich increases the probability that a legislator supports a policy proposal while the opposite, though at an absolutely smaller extent, is the case for poor voters.
Both associations are statistically significant while the coefficient for middle-income is statistically insignificant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We evaluate whether the representation of voter preferences by individual legislators depends on voters incomes. By matching individual legislators' decisions with referendum choices of low, middle, and high-income voters, we obtain a direct and natural measure of congruence. We also distinguish representation of income groups by legislators with different party affiliation (left, center, right) in a multi-party institutional environment typical for European countries.
On average, high-income voters tend to be better represented than middle-and lowincome voters. Center and right party legislators are more congruent with high-income voters than low-income voters while the opposite is true for left party legislators. Our results are consistent with recent important findings by Brunner et al. (2013) for California regarding the fact that legislators reflect the desire of poor, middle, and high-income voters (when analyzed individually), and the fact that party affiliation play role for the pattern of representation.
However, our results suggest that congruence levels increase with voter income terciles such that policy makers do not necessarily behave as if all citizens were politically equal.
Existing differences in the representation of voters of different income groups need to be explained by future research. Explanatory factors may be found on the side of legislators (e.g.
politicians' characteristics; Padovano 2013) and voters (e.g. preference intensities or voter participation; Kasara and Suryanarayan 2014).
